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The keying modules tries to solve two problems, the lack of key separation and the lack of AEAD being used for encryption. The currently used `secrets` doesn't provide this and is hard to adjust to provide this functionality. For encryption, the additional data is now a parameter that can be used, as the underlying primitive is an AEAD constructions. This allows for context binding to happen and can be seen as defense-in-depth; it ensures that if a value X is encrypted for context Y (e.g. ID=3, Column="private_key") it will only decrypt if that context Y is also given in the Decrypt function. This makes confused deputy attack harder to exploit.[^1] For key separation, HKDF is used to derives subkeys from some IKM, which is the value of the `[service].SECRET_KEY` config setting. The context for subkeys are hardcoded, any variable should be shuffled into the the additional data parameter when encrypting. [^1]: This is still possible, because the used AEAD construction is not key-comitting. For Forgejo's current use-case this risk is negligible, because the subkeys aren't known to a malicious user (which is required for such attack), unless they also have access to the IKM (at which point you can assume the whole system is compromised). See https://scottarc.blog/2022/10/17/lucid-multi-key-deputies-require-commitment/ |
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keying.go | ||
keying_test.go |